Autonomy, Responsibility, and Families: Connections, Questions, and Complexities

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The focus of this conference on autonomy and responsibility provides an opportunity to think together in depth about what are sometimes seen as seemingly contradictory values (Kagitcibasi, 1996). In scholarly definitions and some societal contexts, autonomy has often meant separateness or detachment from others; doing as one pleases; individualism; freedom to pursue one’s individual goals unencumbered by responsibility, social obligations or consideration of others; independence; self-oriented individual actions; and self sufficiency, (Chisholm, 1996; Kagitcibasi, 1996; Martini, 1994; Mosier, 1993; Mosier & Rogoff, 2003). Responsibility, on the other hand, has been characterized as cognizance of the impact of one’s own actions on others and avoiding harm to them; responsiveness to others’ needs (nurturing others, providing caregiving and contributing to their welfare); answerableness--being accountable for one’s own actions and repairing damages to others one’s actions have caused; fulfilling obligations and duty; contributing to the household and to family functioning; and learning and engaging in appropriate social behavior (Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007; Mosier, 1993; Rothbaum & Trommsdorff, 2007; Tappan, 1841).

These two values have been identified as differentiating “Western” and “non-Western” cultures. This broad stroke categorizing of much variability into two groups of cultures is acknowledged to be imprecise at best (Rothbaum & Trommsdorff, 2007), but nevertheless is reflected in much scholarly literature. “Western” has been defined as “English-speaking (United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and Western- and Northern-European communities. . . . Non-Western refers to the rest of the world . . . including, but not limited to Asian, African, Middle Eastern, Southern and Eastern European, and Hispanic/Latino communities” (Rothbaum & Trommsdorff, 2007, p. 462). In the US, for example, which has been described as characterized by unbridled individualism (Kagitcibasi, 1996), strong value is placed on personal liberty, which traditions originating in the country’s founding have equated in importance with life itself (Cole &Tan, 2007). People’s rights to determine for themselves their own destinies and numerous lesser determinations are protected through laws and social practices. A strong sense of
individuality has come to be seen as a central facet of social competence within this cultural context. Other Western nations are characterized as having similar orientations, albeit to varying degrees. In contrast, non-Western cultures are seen as more oriented to the group, and to cooperation, interdependence, and relatedness. Dimensions of relatedness have been identified as including love, attachment, intimacy, caring, support, loyalty, mutual obligations, and belongingness (Rothbaum & Trommsdorf, 2007). Several relatedness dimensions tie closely to meanings of responsibility noted above. Relatedness is also often presented as the opposite of autonomy (Kagitcibasi, 1996).

Such broad strokes mask vast differences within these two enormously large categories (Western and Non-Western). Not surprisingly, this broad stroke approach to viewing the world has been criticized and these criticisms have spurred considerable rethinking of meanings of autonomy, relatedness, and responsibility. Over the past three decades, some scholars have reconceptualized autonomy in ways that make more evident what they claim is its compatibility and complementariness with responsibility and relatedness. This Conference provides a valuable opportunity to consider these more recent meanings and to do so within various contexts relevant to education and learning.

Autonomy Reconceptualized

Because values and meanings regarding autonomy pervade environments families inhabited and are reflected in families’ goals, practices, and beliefs regarding their children, research on families and children has included a focus on this concept. Research on families, and in particular on child socialization within families, has produced contradictory findings regarding autonomy for families within and across cultures (e.g., Chao, 1994). These findings have further fueled efforts to reconceptualize meanings of autonomy and to find common ground between its meaning and that of relatedness and responsibility. Recent work on meanings of autonomy that is contributing to deeper understanding is apparent in other fields (May, 1998; Waller, 1998), but that of most interest for this paper is work that has illumined understanding regarding families’ roles in helping their children develop values of autonomy and responsibility. Anthropological psychology and laboratory and field-based psychology are two areas where such work regarding families is evident.

Based on their comparison of child rearing in U.S. and Guatemalan contexts, Mosier and Rogoff have suggested new concepts that put autonomy and responsibility in close relationship and emphasize their compatibility. One of these concepts is voluntary responsibility (Mosier & Rogoff, 2007).

2003). This concept reflects the pattern of child rearing in a Mayan Guatemala context in which children are encouraged by their families and by the values and organization of their culture to take responsibility voluntarily (autonomously, freely choosing to do so). A second, closely related concept is responsible autonomy, which reflects autonomously choosing actions that respect others’ personal freedom of choice and connects autonomy to both values of interdependence and independence (Mosier 1993). In both cases, these researchers focus on the cultural embeddedness of the meaning of autonomy, emphasizing communities and cultural communities to avoid the risk of overgeneralizing findings inherent in discussing nations and cultures. A community is defined as “a group of people having some common local organization, values, and practices” (p. 3). This cultural embeddedness is further discussed in other work they and their colleagues have done in the United States, Guatemala, India, and Turkey (Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu, Mosier, Chavajay, & Heath, 1993).

In contrast to the anthropological orientation of the work just described, Deci and Ryan’s (2000) self-determination theory (SDT) offers a reconceptualization of autonomy and its relationship to responsibility and relatedness from a laboratory and field-based psychological perspective. A theory of motivation, SDT attempts to encompass and integrate phenomena addressed by many other seemingly discrepant theoretical perspectives (Ryan & Deci, 2002). It focuses on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and posits that these are related to three universal, innate, interrelated human psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. SDT theorists are explicit in contrasting meanings for autonomy within SDT with those noted at the beginning of this paper. Autonomy in SDT refers to volition, to experiencing oneself as an agent—as an initiator of one’s own actions, to being the perceived origin or source of one’s own behavior (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 8). Relatedness refers to the desire to feel connected to others— to love and care, and to be loved and cared for” (Deci & Ryan 2000, p. 231); “to have a sense of belongingness both with other individuals and with one’s community” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7). Competence is the need to feel effective in interacting with one’s environment (Grolnick & Farkas, 2002, p. 91); “experiencing opportunities to exercise and express one’s capacities” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7).

SDT theory also posits that a wide variety of actions and behavior meets these needs for different individuals, who are assumed to differ both within themselves and across contexts. SDT posits that human beings seek to meet their needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness through engaging in interesting activities, exercising their capacities, pursuing connectedness in social groups, and integrating intrapscyhic and interpersonal experiences into a relative unity (Deci & Ryan, 2000).

The theory also posits that the environments one experiences may either facilitate or impede these needs being met.

As noted above, SDT posits that people vary from one another in what they find interesting and that intrinsic motivation reflects those interests and activities that a person is naturally drawn to because of his or her psychological make up. Autonomy is essential to intrinsic motivation. Threats, surveillance, evaluation, and deadlines undermine intrinsic motivation (and autonomy). Choice enhances intrinsic motivation (and autonomy). Competence is also central to maintaining intrinsic motivation (e.g., one loses interest in an activity or task if one doesn’t feel one has or can gain the competence for it to continue to be a satisfying pursuit). Intrinsic motivation is also seen as more likely to flourish when relatedness relevant to the activity is secure. SDT also maintains that intrinsic motivation is more likely to flourish when relatedness with others involved in the activity is secure and when a secure relational base provides a backdrop for activities engaged in by oneself or with others.

Internalization is viewed as representing the individual’s active transformation of external regulations into inner values. When internalization is optimal, people understand and identify with the importance of social regulations and assimilate them into their integrated sense of self, fully accepting them as their own. This is a key feature of SDT theory’s ability to explain how responsibility becomes incorporated as a value underlying internally regulated behavior (and how families assist or forestall that process). When the internalization process does not occur or is incomplete, regulation may either remain external or be only partially internalized.

Extrinsic motivation is externally regulated (the motivation comes from something external to the activity itself) and involves those interests and activities and behavior that others encourage or require of the individual and ascribe importance to. Behavior is externally regulated and externally controlled by rewards or threats of punishment. The person’s need for autonomy is not addressed, and when the externally instituted contingency is removed, the behavior is unlikely to persist. Introjected regulation is partially internal, in that it is within the person (the person administers the contingencies rather than their being externally administered), but is accompanied by considerable internal conflict, because the person doesn’t really want to do the action. Identified regulation is more internalized. The person understands and agrees with the values and rationale underlying the action, but these have not yet become fully internalized to the point where they are integrated with other values and aspects of the person’s life. Integrated regulation, on the other hand reflects this

integration and is fully internal. Mosier and Rogoff’s conceptualizations of voluntary responsibility (freely chosen responsibility) and responsible autonomy (freely chosen activity that considers others’ freedom of choice) noted above seem to capture this level of internalization of responsibility.

SDT posits that people are not only naturally inclined to have interests and to pursue them, but also that people will tend naturally to internalize the values and regulations of their social group. This latter tendency spurs their willingness to enact what has been externally motivated and their eventual internalization of it as their own. This tendency is facilitated by feelings of relatedness with socializing others, feelings of competence regarding the regulation being internalized (including being able to enact it and to understand the reasons for it), and support for the individual’s autonomy in freely processing, endorsing, and modifying the values and regulations being internalized. As Deci & Ryan (2000) note: “Excessive external pressures, controls, and evaluations appear to forestall rather than facilitate this active, constructive process of giving personal meaning and valence to acquired regulations “ (p. 238).

Even fully internalized, however, and fully self determined, internalized extrinsic motivation does not typically become intrinsic motivation. It remains extrinsic motivation because, even though fully volitional, it is instrumental rather than being done because it is intrinsically interesting and rewarding (Deci & Ryan, 2000).

The types of regulation, along with the reconceptualized meaning of autonomy and its interrelated role with competence and relatedness as innate human psychological needs reveal how SDT addresses the dilemma noted at the beginning of this paper regarding autonomy versus relatedness and responsibility. SDT puts these concepts together in a theoretical framework that shows how autonomy, relatedness, and responsibility do not contradict each other, but instead mutually reinforce and complement each other. According to Deci & Ryan (2000):

It is in people’s nature to develop greater autonomy (as represented by greater integration within the self) and greater relatedness (as represented by the assimilation and integration of oneself within the social community). Not only are the two trajectories not antithetical, but the healthiest development involves both. . . . To be autonomous does not mean to be detached from or independent of others. . . . Autonomy involves being volitional, acting from one’s integrated sense of self, and endorsing one’s actions. It does not entail being separate from, not relying upon, or being independent of others (p. 242).

SDT is not the only conceptualization that has attempted a framework that incorporates autonomy, relatedness, and responsibility, nor the only approach to resolving the complexities of understanding how these three values are expressed in various cultural contexts (see, for example, Kagitcibasi, 1996; Rothbaum & Trommsdorf, 2007), but it is one of the most comprehensive attempts. It addresses interrelationships among these three concepts and has generated a considerable amount of research. The attempt in SDT to encompass and integrate phenomena addressed by several other theoretical perspectives is another of its strengths. Some of these theoretical perspectives are represented in the section below on families’ role in helping children develop values of autonomy and responsibility.

The view in SDT of people as sentient beings who have intentions and meanings that must be considered in understanding their motivations and behavior is also an important feature. This view is reflected in the theory’s proposition that people don’t necessarily just assimilate externally initiated mores and values, but that they need to have the autonomy to modify them in order to fully internalize them. This feature of the theory enables it to accommodate the increasingly understood bidirectional influence between parents and children. Parent-child research in more recent years has shown the importance of the child’s agency and influence on parents (Kuczynski & Parkin, 2007). The view of people in SDT also enables the theory to account for and accommodate widely ranging variation in human behavior, orientations, environments, and perspectives, including the different cultural, community, and familial frames within which people have been socialized, and the different personality orientations and temperaments of individuals. Deci and Ryan (2000) note that, with respect to culture:

The means through which autonomy is expressed can differ across-cultures . . . . autonomy, relative to control, is crucial for intrinsic motivation and well being, but the forms that autonomy takes can nonetheless vary in accord with what is culturally meaningful. (p. 247)

Nevertheless, the potential for cross-cultural relevance of SDT’s autonomy definition has been criticized. In commenting on SDT-based research reported by Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, & Kaplan (2003), Rothbaum and Trommsdorf (2007), note the encouraging character of SDT’s definition of autonomy in its encompassing nature and marked departure from standard definitions. They also criticize SDT’s linking of the definition, however, to well-integrated self, self-esteem, and subjective well-being as implicitly reflecting Western assumptions. More recent work by Chirkov, Sheldon, and Ryan (2011) is more explicit about meanings of autonomy in non-Western societies.

Having laid the foundation of meanings for the central concepts of interest (autonomy and responsibility) and their relationship to other pertinent concepts (relatedness, regulation of behavior), the next section turns to a discussion of theory and research regarding families’ roles in helping children develop the values of autonomy and responsibility. Much of this research has been done by Western researchers regarding Western families and children and within theoretical frameworks developed by Western scholars. The problems this presents for designing research conducted in non-Western cultures and interpreting findings from such studies are apparent and have helped to spawn the reconceptualizations of autonomy discussed here.

**Roles of Families in Helping Children Develop the Values of Autonomy and Responsibility**

In this section theory and research that directly addresses roles of families in helping children develop the values of autonomy and responsibility are discussed. Parental goals in children’s socialization are affected by their cultural context. Family socialization research that has applied Western perspectives of desired socialization goals to non-Western societies (and to some subgroups within Western societies) has resulted in findings that have suggested differences in parental socialization goals based on different cultural priorities (Chao, 1994). Findings regarding autonomy have been among the most discrepant in this research. As a result, as noted in the previous section, meanings of and assumptions underlying autonomy have been examined and reconceptualized. Those reconceptualizations are reflected in the research on families and children discussed in this section.

Both cross-cultural research and SDT and research have contributed to deeper understandings of meanings of autonomy and responsibility and their development, interrelatedness and interdependence. Discussion of children’s autonomy and responsibility development in families from these two perspectives comprise the first two subsections below. Other subsections discuss additional bodies of theory and research that cross-cultural theory and research and SDT and research point to as relevant to children’s autonomy and responsibility development. These subsections focus on attachment, self-regulation, and prosocial development.

In a review of the child socialization research regarding family diversity, Patterson and Hastings et al. (2007) point out that in research on various families defined by researchers as diverse, findings have consistently indicated that family resources, processes, and relationships are more important predictors of child socialization outcomes than the category of diversity that

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families are placed in. Supportive family processes and relationships, and family resources sufficient to meet children’s needs are what is typically linked to successful child socialization, even when structural characteristics of families may differ from what is perceived as typical or even normative. Parental goals for children, family patterns of interaction, parental strategies and actions, and the organization and climate of family life are more central to children’s development of autonomy and responsibility than are family structure variables. In the past, these variables have been configured into parenting styles (e.g., Baumrind, 1991). In more recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the child’s role in and influence on family process, relationship, and climate variables. Consequently work on parenting styles (which focused more exclusively on parent to child influence) has been less prominent, and research has moved to finer grained analyses that offer possibilities for understanding why parenting style findings have been somewhat contradictory (with respect to various ethnic and racial groups, in particular). For these reasons, with few exceptions, the discussion that follows is limited to scholarly literature published within the last two decades. In addition, in an effort to keep the scope of this paper within reasonable bounds, emphasis was placed on research that focuses on normative families and on contrasting perspectives that have considerable potential to illuminate enriched understanding of families’ roles in children’s development of autonomy and responsibility values rather than on an effort to be comprehensive.

Cross-Cultural Comparison of Family Contexts and Practices Relevant to Development of Children’s Autonomy and Responsibility

The examples noted here of cross-cultural work that highlights how children learn autonomy and responsibility in the family context are only a taste of a large cross-cultural literature regarding families and children. The work reported below, however, reflects in-depth analyses of family interactions within cultural frames that expand understanding of families’ roles in helping children develop autonomy and responsibility. The anthropological and socio-cultural perspectives reflected in the work lead to different kinds of insights than other psychology-based literature dealing with families’ roles and practices regarding their children.

Drawing on philosophical perspectives in conceptualizing responsibility, Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) outline meanings of responsibility that call attention to ways in which families influence children’s accountability in everyday family life. These researchers point to three dimensions of responsibility that day-to-day family life is a crucible for promoting (p. 394). The first dimension, social awareness, “involves attention to situated activities, participants, and judgment.” The second

dimension, social responsiveness, “involves prosocial dispositions and behaviors, especially attunement to others’ needs.” The third dimension, self-reliance, “includes the ability to depend on one’s intellectual, emotional, and physical resources. Self-reliance is related to personal autonomy, involving self-initiation and self-regulation of one’s behavior.” Social awareness and social responsibility are seen as related to interdependence and all three are seen as centrally necessary for a child to be morally responsible in any culture (Ochs & Izquierdo, 2009). Taken together, the three dimensions conceptually connect concepts that have been a focus of research on children’s socialization in families for many years (i.e., prosocial development and self-regulation—including emotion regulation) with the concepts of interest in this paper (autonomy and responsibility). As noted earlier, self-regulation (including emotion-regulation) and prosocial development are each discussed in separate subsections below.

Mosier and Rogoff’s (2003) comparison of U.S. middle class families in Salt Lake City and Mayan families in San Pedro, Guatemala revealed how children were differentially socialized regarding autonomy and responsibility in these two settings. The researchers described the “privileged position” accorded infants in San Pedro, where infants, older siblings, parents, and other community members spent a considerable amount of time together each day as they did the daily tasks of life. Older siblings were expected to let infants and toddlers “have their way” in choice of objects that interested the infant and toddler and in the kinds of activity infants and toddlers initiated. Based on their observations of and discussions with families, researchers interpreted this practice as respect for infants’ and toddlers’ freedom of choice. Infants and toddlers were not yet expected to be accountable for their own actions because they were viewed as not yet understanding how to cooperate with others or how to willfully misbehave. When a new sibling was born, the youngest child who had held this privileged position (and been given a chance to observe and experience how other people respected their own and others’ choices) was then expected to provide those privileges to the new sibling, to play a role in caregiving responsibilities for the younger child, and to assume other responsibilities that also contributed to the family. Thus, experience of autonomy was established first, followed by the experience of responsibility for supporting aspects of family life. The researchers report that the siblings (who were young themselves—e.g., from 2-5 years old) took considerable responsibility for the new infant and did so willingly without complaining. Mosier (1993) described the kind of experience that Mayan children have in this context as autonomy and responsibility and used the term, responsible autonomy to convey that
respect for others’ freedom of choice is freely chosen.

Mosier and Rogoff (1993) suggested that the Mayan toddlers’ privileged position might be viewed as indulgence by U.S. researchers. They noted, however, that it was not simply indulgence or relaxation of rules for taking turns. Instead, these researchers understood the practice as protection of the toddler from being forced to comply so that the child would learn to voluntarily cooperate. The toddler experienced a model for how to treat others and adversarial relations between siblings and between child and parent were avoided. Mosier and Rogoff asserted that discussions of differences between “Western and non-Western,” “individualist and collectivist” and “independence-oriented and interdependence-oriented” societies reflect the assumption that either group needs or individual choice must be given priority. In contrast to this dualism, the goal in San Pedro families’ practices described above was for individuals to choose by their own will to cooperate with others (voluntary responsibility) and to “make responsible decisions that also respected others’ personal freedom of choice”, (Mosier 1993,) (responsible autonomy).

In contrast, Salt Lake City infants and toddlers were expected to play by the same basic rules as their older siblings (with some age appropriate leniency). Concepts of sharing (e.g., equal time allotments with a toy for each child) were introduced and when a toddler had used a toy for his or her allotted time, it was expected that the toy be given up to the older sibling who was awaiting his or her turn to have it. Mosier and Rogoff (2003) interpreted this practice as preparing the infant and toddler for the contexts of life in the US, which are characterized by individual rights and fair competition in negotiations regarding separate but equal access to resources. Older siblings were observed to negotiate more with their parents over rights and to expect that rules they were held to were applicable to the toddler as well. In this context, the parent may compel the toddler’s cooperative behavior to counter willfulness and to assist learning of appropriate behavior. Mosier and Rogoff noted that adversarial relations between parent and child are often initiated in these kinds of parent-child exchanges. Guatemalan mothers, on the other hand, almost never overruled their toddler or insisted upon an activity, although they did attempt to persuade. Similarly, in describing the approach of middle-class Japanese mothers, Kobayashi (2001) notes that mothers work to elicit spontaneous compliance from the child that the child experiences as voluntary. By seldom opposing the child, treating the child with empathy, and encouraging his or her empathy toward others, parents assist the child in coming to understand and accept social rules and voluntarily comply with them (Lebra, 1994).

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In addition to differences between mothers and children’s interactions in the two contexts, interactions between the children differed as well (Mosier & Rogoff, 2003). In San Pedro, older siblings’ predominant communication with toddlers did not involve competition but instead included offering or helping with objects, joint working of objects, and sometimes expanding the toddler’s agenda for the object to include the older sibling’s own agenda. In contrast, in the Salt Lake City context, interactions reflecting competition between the children in relation to the objects predominated and included solicitations for and attempts to take over objects. San Pedro older siblings did not complain about giving up an object of interest to the infant who wanted it, as did older siblings in Salt Lake City.

Mosier and Rogoff (2003) noted differences in the amount and types of responsibilities assumed by children that mothers in the two contexts reported. In contrast to toddlers, San Pedro older siblings (ages 2 to 5), in addition to caring for their younger sibling, were reported to be their own primary caregivers and to have responsibility for contributing to their families by engaging in household chores and working in the fields. In Salt Lake City, mothers reported that toddlers and their older siblings had responsibilities that were similar to each other and which included picking up their toys, collecting their dirty clothes for washing, and throwing away trash. Mosier and Rogoff noted that the responsibilities of older siblings in Salt Lake City were less mature than those the San Pedro older siblings assumed.

In comparing middle class families in Los Angeles with families in Samoa and Peru, Ochs & Izquierdo (2009) reported findings similar to those of Mosier and Rogoff regarding types and amount of responsibility assumed by children in the U.S. context compared to the others. In their study of Australian and Canadian families, Grusec, Goodnow, & Cohen (1996) differentiated between self-care and family-care tasks that children were assigned and between whether the tasks were routinely expected to be self-initiated by the child or occasional special requests made by the parent. Findings indicated that only when children were assigned family-care tasks that were expected to be routinely self-initiated by the child was there a positive correlation between children’s participation in household work and the child’s spontaneous, voluntary demonstration of responsibility for other family members in the form of prosocial behavior toward them.

Mosier and Rogoff (2003) provide numerous examples of cultures that reflect respect for freedom of choice accompanied by cooperation as seen in their San Pedro data. They point out that the idea in such a context is not that people don’t have individual goals, but that mature behavior is...
to coordinate one’s own goals with those of the group (this budding capacity seems reflected in the older San Pedro siblings’ enlargement of the toddler’s agenda for a play object to include their own agenda for the object). Older siblings’ ability to give up their privileged status as they leave toddlerhood is facilitated by a system in which both “responsibility to other people and respect for individuals’ choices are inherent to human relations” (Mosier & Rogoff, 2003, p. 1057).

The meaning of autonomy reflected in Mosier’s and Rogoff’s work reported here is freedom of choice. Meanings of responsibility that are reflected include cooperation, consideration of and respect for others’ freedom of choice, contribution to one’s families’ needs, and coordination of one’s individual goals with those of the group. Mosier’s and Rogoff’s work and that by Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) reflect the significance of involvement in their families’ everyday routines to children’s learning regarding autonomy and responsibility. As Rogoff et al. (1993) point out, this avenue for families to help children learn is constrained in cultures where families and children spend large portions of their daily life apart (e.g., when children are in school for large portions of their day and year, when parents are working at separate locations from where children are, etc.). In a similar vein, Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) point to the geographic distances that characterize nuclear family structure in the West and the more limited opportunities for consistent socialization practices across extended family members and neighboring households that accompany these distances.

As already noted, in their comparative study of middle class Los Angeles families, Matsigenkan families in Peru’s Amazon region, and Samoan families on the island of Upolu, Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) reported similar patterns to those identified by Mosier and Rogoff. They also noted additional characteristics of family expectations and socialization practices regarding children’s responsibilities in everyday routines in these settings. They observed low expectations on the part of Los Angeles parents regarding children’s day-to-day responsibilities, limited and inconsistent enforcement of these expectations, and parents’ inconsistent expression of values and ideals. These inconsistencies resulted in children’s receiving conflicting messages from their parents, which impaired these families’ abilities to help their children develop and enact responsibility as a value. In addition, Ochs and Izquierdo pointed to an assumption that children are not competent to adequately perform household duties, which they saw reflected in the Los Angeles parents’ practices and in popular advice given to parents. This assumption might also be seen as reflected in the low level of responsibilities described by Mosier and Rogoff as expected of the older Salt Lake City siblings, and in Grusec’s et al.’s (1996) report that children across the Western

societies included in their study were not expected to do much household work. Ochs and Izquierdo suggest that this assumption may underlie parental practices in not assigning much household work to children in Western societies and parents seeming to value children’s household work less than do parents in other cultures. This assumption may also be reflected in Grusec et al.’s description of barriers to parents’ assigning household tasks to children as including being able to do it more promptly and efficiently themselves, lack of children’s follow through on tasks, and a low level of children’s performance on household chores (which Grusec et al. note is a major source of family conflict in adolescence). Ochs’ and Izquierdo (2009) also point out that the data from their other two sites in which children had significant responsibilities for everyday tasks dispel this assumption. Mosier and Rogoff’s Guatemalan families data similarly dispel the assumption.

In discussing the implications for autonomy development of being assigned the mature, significant daily life responsibilities reflected in the lives of children in the Peruvian and Samoan cultures they studied, Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) noted the opportunities that children have to experience agency, to learn from their mistakes over repeated occasions of enacting a task, and to develop confidence in their task competence. For example, in studying the responsibilities of the older Mayan sibling as a teacher of their younger sibling Maynard (2002) reported that older siblings’ teaching skills were observed to increase over time as they worked with their younger sibling. By age 4 older siblings took responsibility for initiating teaching situations with their toddler siblings, and by age 8, older siblings were highly skilled in combining talk and demonstration, providing verbal feedback and explanations, and guiding their younger sibling’s body.

Finally, it should be noted, that the Maynard study described above also pointed out another dimension of families’ contribution to children’s autonomy and responsibility development—that of siblings’ roles regarding each other. Not only did the older sibling gain competence in teaching (contributing to this child’s autonomy and capacity for responsibility), but the younger sibling’s ability to participate in culturally important tasks was advanced (contributing to his or her autonomy and capacity for responsibility). Thus, siblings aided each other in learning to become more competent, which in turn advanced their autonomy and responsibility.

**Summary and Discussion.** The cross-cultural work reported in this section indicates clear differences in parental goals for children’s autonomy and responsibility development. These differences reflect families’ current communities and those they anticipate for their children. The
range of expectations for children’s participation in everyday routines reflects these goals. More than based on parent preferences, parents’ goals and expectations are attuned to the way life is organized in their settings and to assumptions prevalent in those settings. Autonomy in settings shaped by competition principles is expressed differently than in settings shaped by cooperation principles, but in either case, freedom of choice marks its meaning. Responsibility for self is different from responsibility to and for others in its expression, enactment, and consequences. When children are focused on only taking care of themselves, their opportunities to learn all three dimensions of responsibility that Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) assert are essential for a child to be morally responsible in any culture (social awareness, social responsiveness, and self-reliance) are more limited than when children are also focused on contributing to care for others.

**SDT-Based Research on Family Contexts and Practices Relevant to Children’s Autonomy and Responsibility**

Grusec (2002) asserts that values are both transmitted by parents to children and constructed by children. Values development is a complex process that involves parental influence and input and children as active agents in the process of constructing, transforming and accepting values for themselves. SDT provides a conceptualization of this bidirectional process in which the child is not only an active participant in internalizing values parents may hold dear, but also a modifier of them. As noted earlier, several of SDT’s central concepts address meanings of and development of autonomy and responsibility. SDT encompasses and attempts to integrate phenomena relevant to children’s development of autonomy and responsibility reflected across a wide range of theories and research, including phenomena of interest in child socialization theory and research. SDT scholars (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997) note that “effective socialization requires something more than behavior in accord with parental demands. It involves an inner adaptation to social requirements so that children not only comply with these requirements but also accept and endorse the advocated values and behaviors, experiencing them as their own” (p. 135). The real goal is for children to volitionally act in accord with what is considered appropriate in their social group—to own values. Volition, as opposed to compliance, “requires a transformation of internal structures by which the child fully assimilates the values underlying the behaviors” (p. 135).

Wendy Grolnick has been a significant force over the past two decades in working with her colleagues to apply SDT concepts to families and children. In her 2003 book, Grolnick brings her own and others’ research to bear on the significance of children’s autonomy development and

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parental autonomy support, parents’ approaches to control, and parental goals for fostering children’s internalizing (or taking responsibility for) the regulation of their own behavior. Grolnick (2003) defines internalization as “the process through which individuals acquire beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral regulations from external sources and progressively transform those external regulations into personal attributes, values or regulatory styles (p. 54). Grolnick notes that internalization will be most likely when the environment satisfies the child’s needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. She proposes, and provides evidence to support, three conditions in family environments that facilitate these needs being met: Autonomy support, structure, and involvement.

Grolnick (2003) defines autonomy as the experience of self-initiation or choicefulness (p. 79) and autonomy support as taking a child’s frame of reference, supporting independent problem solving, and involving the child in creating rules and structures (p. xi). Autonomy support helps children feel that they are initiators of their action rather than feel that they are being coerced. Autonomy supportive techniques include such practices as introducing choice, acknowledging the child’s feelings about engaging in an activity, and increasing the interest value of activities to make them more fun, inviting, and engaging. When limits have to be set, for example, acknowledging the child’s feelings about this decreases the pressure and control children experience. Even with very young children, SDT researchers have shown that mothers’ autonomy support was been linked to greater infant exploration and persistence in a play task compared to more controlling mothers’ practices (Grolnick, Frodi, & Bridges, 1984).

Grolnick (2003) outlines the environmental condition of structure as including rules, expectations, guidelines, and standards for behavior (plus the underlying reasons for them); a system of their consistent enforcement (e.g., monitoring); and sufficient organization to make daily routines predictable. Grolnick discusses several contributions of structure to children’s autonomy. First, structure helps children learn the rationale behind desired behavior. Such understanding is necessary for fully integrated internalization to occur. Second, the organizational aspect of structure helps children know what to expect when. Parents who provide structure help children learn to self-regulate their behavior. This aspect of structure enables children to assume responsibility for planning and coordinating their activities with those of other family members and, in sociocultural theory terms, to choose to coordinate their own goals with those of their family (to experience voluntary responsibility and responsible autonomy). Grolnick discusses structure as encompassing

control, but distinguishes between parents being in control (reflected in the description above of structure) versus being controlling. She describes controlling parental behavior as leading a child to feel like his or her behavior is being initiated from without and that he or she is not capable of solving his or her own problems.

Grolnick reports research that suggests structure also addresses children’s need for competence in that structure provides information and contextual elements that enable children to learn, understand, and be successful in their cultural context. For example, through the rationales provided by parents for why certain rules and expectations are desirable, children increase their understanding about the world and gain information they need to know about how the world works that allows them to develop competence in areas that matter to their goals and responsibilities. In Grolnick’s and Ryan’s 1989 study, compared to children whose parents provided less structure, children whose parents created more structure were found to feel more in control in school and to convey a sense that there were predictable consequences to their actions (e.g., trying hard in school will lead to doing well).

The third need, relatedness, is defined in SDT as feeling connected to others, caring for and being cared for by those others, and having a sense of belongingness both with other individuals and one’s community. It is the psychological sense of being with others in secure communion or unity (Ryan & Deci, 2002). The third environment condition, involvement, addresses this need. Involvement entails providing resources to the child, taking an interest in the child and their activities, and knowing what is going on with the child. This environment condition is important because when a child’s relatedness needs are met through having a positive relationship with an involved, supportive parent, children will be most likely to internalize regulations. They are most likely to attend to and want to emulate such a parent’s behavior.

Given SDT’s theory that the needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are interrelated, and that meeting each contributes to meeting the others, Grolnick (2003) notes that when parents provide a supportive context for their children, they address these needs, enhance the likelihood that the child will internalize values they desire their children to have, and help children deepen their internal, self-regulation of their own behavior. For example, Grolnick’s and Ryan’s (1989) study indicated that compared to parents who were rated as more controlling, parents’ provision of autonomy support was positively related to children’s reports of autonomous self-regulation, teacher ratings of the children’s competence and adjustment, and the children’s school

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achievement. Children of more autonomy supportive parents engaged in less disruptive behavior in the classroom and had better learning habits (such as better study skills) than those of more controlling parents. Parental provision of structure was positively related to the children’s reporting greater understanding of how to control their successes and failures both in school and in general. Maternal involvement was positively related to children’s teacher-rated competence and adjustment and to school grades and achievement scores. In a separate study (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1991), children who rated their parents as more autonomy supportive and involved were more self-regulated in school, had higher self-perceived competence and a greater understanding of the sources of control of school outcomes compared to children who rated their parents lower on these provisions. The characteristics of the children of more autonomy supportive parents, in turn, predicted these children’s better school performance. Avery and Ryan (1988) found that urban minority children’s reports of parental involvement and autonomy support were positively related to more nurturant qualities of the children’s representations in a projective activity and that children’s representations were, in turn, related to better classroom adjustment. Greater internalization in children of involved parents relative to children of parents who are less involved has also been found. For example, Grolnick and Slowiczek (1994) found that both mother and father involvement predicted their children’s internalization. Ryan, Stiller, and Lynch (1994) found that positive quality of relatedness of junior high and high school students to their parents and teachers was associated with the adolescents’ greater internalization regarding school-related activities and sense of well-being.

SDT has the potential to illuminate why some research studies on parents’ practices in relation to children’s outcomes may be mixed. Research focused on parental techniques (e.g., discipline techniques, motivation techniques, control techniques) rather than the quality dimensions of the context parents provide in the home, may result in mixed findings regarding a given technique. Grolnick (2003) notes that parental tone of voice and body language in communicating with a child can convey very different messages surrounding the same message content. Because of this, she notes that parental techniques and practices, such as providing rewards to children, when unexpected and offered and interpreted by the child as positive feedback regarding one’s competence or effectiveness at a task, may not undermine intrinsic motivation. Neither is praise always undermining of competence or autonomy if it provides positive feedback that is informational in nature. In addition, the premise in SDT of a particular action or message having

different meanings to different individuals also suggests the possibility that a parent’s practice may have different meanings to different children, including children within the same family.

Summary and Discussion. The emphasis in SDT research regarding families and children is on parent’s provision of environmental characteristics predicted by SDT to enhance children’s autonomy, competence, and relatedness and on children’s school-related outcomes. This SDT-based research (that has only been sampled in this discussion) suggests that, compared to parents who don’t, parents who do provide the recommended environmental characteristics have children who are more able to regulate their own behavior and to act responsibly and function competently in school. SDT theory and research shed light on why highly controlling parents constrain their children’s development. Previous research on parenting styles and practices has established this link, but with some mixed findings and somewhat limited explanatory power.

There are similarities reflected in the SDT and research and the cross-cultural research and perspectives reported in the previous section. For example, the SDT perspective on autonomy as the experience of self-initiation and choicefulness seems to be applicable to the cross-cultural contexts examined in the previous section, and the meaning of autonomy noted in those contexts as freedom of choice, seems to be similarly compatible with SDT theory and research. The concept of internalization in SDT as a shift from external to internal regulation, once fully accomplished, seems also to be captured by the cross-cultural researchers’ terms, voluntary responsibility and responsible autonomy. SDT’s emphasis on the importance of a child’s sense of being able to solve their own problems is similar to cross-cultural researchers’ ideas of self-reliance.

The SDT perspective and research also differs in several ways from that in the cross-cultural comparison work. In some of the cross-cultural settings, responsibility encompassed responsibility to and for others in addition to responsibility for self. The cross-cultural studies mentioned children’s responsibility for self-care, but noted the extensive other-focused responsibilities that children assumed in some communities. SDT-based research regarding children and families, however, seems to primarily focus on responsibility for self. There is little to no evidence of child outcomes within the set of SDT studies discussed regarding responsible action toward others. Outcomes were focused on children’s responsibility for their own behavior, especially that related to functioning and performance in school. In addition, the SDT-based research focuses on parental provisions and implies that parents are the ones responsible for children’s development of autonomy and responsibility values. The cross-cultural comparison work examined provisions supporting

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children’s autonomy and responsibility as well, and demonstrated how, in some communities these are set within a broader cultural context, including the structure of everyday life and the organization of the setting that families and their children inhabit. These provisions are not something “extra” or “special” that parents do in these settings, but rather, they are embedded in the pattern of daily family and community activities. Children have considerable responsibility for themselves and for their own learning in these settings.

**Attachment Theory and Research Relevant to Children’s Autonomy and Responsibility**

The attachment-caregiving parent-child relationship is significant to both autonomy and responsibility. Their roots are established in the exploratory behavior, self-regulation, and prosocial development that are linked to a securely attached caregiver-child relationship.

Bowlby’s ethologically-oriented attachment theory posits that mother and child are equipped to form a mutual bond that supports the infant’s survival. Attachment of child and caregiver occurs as the caregiver responds to the infant’s episodes of distress (e.g., hunger, fear, discomfort). Attachment theory holds that when the caregiver’s responses are consistent over time in relieving the child’s distress, the child constructs a “working model” of self and others that is based in secure attachment to the caregiver (Bretherton, Golby, & Cho, 1997). This working model reflects a view of self as worthy of care and of others as reliable in meeting one’s needs. The child’s working model influences the child’s expectations regarding self and others. Assuming that the quality of caregiving is sustained as the child matures, a child with a secure attachment history who brings this working model to new relationships is likely to have positive expectations concerning the value of relationships, confidence in his or her ability to elicit needed reactions, capacity for regulating emotion, and exploratory skills that have been nurtured within the secure base of the attachment relationship (Sroufe, 2002).

With his colleagues, Alan Sroufe has directed a more than 30-year longitudinal study of attachment from birth into adulthood for 175 study participants born into poverty. Findings from this work have indicated that, compared to children who were insecurely attached in infancy, those who were securely attached were more likely to show autonomy-related behavior. This included less dependence, more exploration and curiosity, and greater agency and purposefulness (Sroufe, 2002). SDT researchers have reported findings showing infants’ mastery motivation as related to both secure attachment and mothers’ autonomy support (Frodi, Bridges, & Grolnick, 1985).

Secure attachment has also been linked to the child’s ability to self-regulate his or her

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emotions, to regulate his or her own behavior and resist temptation, and to respond with empathy and prosocial behavior to another’s distress (Davidov and Grusec, 2006; Rodriquez, et al. 2005). Findings have documented these patterns in very young children. With respect to prosocial behavior, for example, Kiang, Moreno, & Robinson (2004) found more prosocial responses to mother’s distress simulations among 21 and 24 month-old infants who were securely attached compared to those who were insecurely attached. Sroufe’s longitudinal study teams have also found that the children who had been identified as securely attached in infancy were more likely at preschool age to exhibit concern for others and effective prosocial behavior, whereas children who had been insecurely attached in infancy were more likely to taunt or harass a child who was injured or to become upset or distraught (Sroufe, 2002). Hastings et al. (2007) reported similar findings based on their review of attachment findings and children’s prosocial development; early attachment security of the parent-infant/ toddler relationship predicted stronger prosocial development (as expressed in prosocial behavior toward peers) in all but one study reviewed.

The quality of caregiving at later stages of children’s development continues to be important, including and perhaps especially, parents autonomy support. In a series of parent-child interactions stimulated by the researchers with 13-year-old adolescents and their parents, when the adolescent was able to freely express positions and stay connected to the parent despite differences in their viewpoints, the relationship with the parent supported the teen’s exploration rather than detracted from it. In other dyads, the parent’s difficulty in acknowledging the teen’s increasing maturity and other relationship issues interfered with the adolescent’s exploration (Sroufe, 2002).

Summary and Discussion. The attachment relationship underlies a great many central aspects of autonomy and responsibility. Children’s exploratory behavior and self-regulation capacities, which support children’s autonomy, are stronger when children’s history of attachment to their caregiver has been secure versus insecure. Children’s empathy and prosocial behavior (which might be considered proxy variables for responsibility to and for others) are also stronger when their attachment to their caregiver has been secure versus insecure. As the child grows and matures, attachment to the primary caregiver can change. If it continues to be secure, the same benefits will be evident, although in different forms.

Self-Regulation Theory and Research Relevant to Children’s Autonomy and Responsibility

As noted by Grolnick (2003) and Ochs and Izquierdo (2009), self-regulation is integral to children’s abilities to be autonomous and responsible. Self-regulation frees children from the need
for external regulation. It enables them to enact autonomously motivated action (whether that action is based on fully internalized values and mores or emanates from intrinsic motivation) in ways that consider others, are deemed acceptable by their social group, and are effective for their own purposes.

Children are learning to regulate themselves from infancy on. For example, young infants (3-6 months old) are capable of soothing themselves when emotionally aroused and managing their attentional focus to avoid further arousal (e.g., to distract themselves) (Calkins, 2004). Calkins (2004) suggests that an apt definition of self-regulation is a “system of adaptive control that may be observed at the level of physiological, attentional, emotional, behavioral, cognitive, and interpersonal or social processes”, (p. 336). Children’s ability to think before acting, delay gratification, control impulses, resist temptation, and engage in effortful control and moral behavior are some areas of self-regulation that have been studied. In addition to seeking to better understand the nature of children’s self-regulation, researchers have also studied how it develops and what influences its development. For example, as noted in the previous subsection, a secure attachment relationship has been associated with children’s self-regulation; and SDT’s focus on internalization processes illuminates how what is externally controlled by others becomes internally controlled (self-regulated) by the child.

Some cognitive aspects of self-regulation are reflected in the cross-cultural and SDT subsections in relation to the learning that families help children do regarding what is important and why. Socio-cultural theorists suggest that by participating in daily activities and interactions in their families and communities, children not only learn how to participate in activities and functions important in their social group, but also the ways of thinking (e.g., the rationales, values, etc.) that surround and guide such activities and functions (Rogoff, 1990). Along these lines, Grusec (2002) has noted that parents can facilitate cognitive aspects of self-regulation by enhancing the clarity of their messages to children so that children are able to accurately perceive them. In addition, sibling-focused research has revealed that older sibling caregivers in societies such those studied by Mosier and Rogoff (2003) and Ochs and Izquierdo (2009) do much more than attend to immediate biological needs of their younger siblings. Older siblings in such settings have been described as culture brokers who introduce their younger sibling(s) to ways of acting and knowing, which in turn helps the younger sibling regulate his or her own behavior to fit the cultural setting (Zukow-Goldring, 2002).

Emotion regulation includes the use of physical, cognitive, and/or behavioral strategies to dampen or amplify internal emotional experience and/or external emotional expression (Denham, Bassett, & Wyatt, 2007). The attachment relationship has been viewed as primary in infants’ emotional functioning and in their abilities to internalize expectations of others. For example, secure attachment has been linked to infants’ and children’s abilities to autonomously control their emotions (Calkins, 2004). Aspects of children’s self-regulation have been shown to be stronger in homes where children experience parental warmth, positive affect, and responsiveness; emotional support; not too much or too little guidance; and the absence of hostility, rejection, and disciplinary practices that are frightening to the child (Eisenberg, Smith, Sadowsky, & Spinrad, 2004; McCabe, Cunnington, & Brooks-Gunn, 2004).

Emotion regulation is increasingly thought to be involved in other kinds of self-regulation (Calkins, 2004). Parental practices related to children’s emotion regulation have been found to range from deliberate efforts to help children understand and manage their emotions to ignoring children’s emotions, negating them, and suppressing expression of them. Parents model emotions, react to their children’s emotions, and intentionally teach children about emotions, all of which contribute to children’s emotional development and competence, including their emotion regulation capacities (Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad,1998). Parental explanations and discussions about emotions, openness to and encouragement of emotional expressivity, and setting limits regarding expression of emotions in ways that might be hurtful to others assist children in understanding and regulating their emotions (Hastings et al., 2007).

Judy Dunn, a well known sibling researcher, reports several ways in which emotional and cognitive dimensions of children’s social understanding is related to having a sibling (Dunn, 2007). Greater social understanding supports self-regulation. First, the intense emotional context (both positive and negative) that siblings provide for each other provides children with wide opportunities for emotional experience and developing understanding of one’s own and other’s emotions. Second, children with siblings have more numerous opportunities at younger ages to develop their powers of social understanding; children with an older sibling, in particular, have an edge in social understanding over age mates with no older sibling. For example, siblings ages 2-4 have been observed to engage in interactions with each other about why people behave the way they do, including mental states and feelings as causes and consequences of action. Third, the connection between imaginative pretend play and social understanding is well established; siblings provide

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opportunities for each other to engage in this kind of play, especially if they like each other and have a friendly relationship.

Kochanska (2002) defines conscience as “a reliable internal guidance system that regulates conduct without the need for external control” (p. 192). Conscience development is seen in this view as organizing four components essential to moral self-regulation, including emotion, self-control, and cognitive facets of awareness and understanding of behavioral standards (Kochanska, 1997). Foundations for this internal guidance system have been viewed as established through children’s experiences in their families, beginning with the attachment system and evolving through familial interactions as the child grows and develops. Children’s development of internal moral guidelines and principles are fostered by parents providing information to children about what behaviors are expected and why (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002). Findings regarding children’s moral development indicate associations with provision by parents of opportunities for children to learn about others’ perspectives and feelings, and with involvement of children in family decision making and in thinking about moral decisions (Eisenberg and Valiente, 2002). Eisenberg and Valiente point out that such parents are also likely to model moral behaviors and thinking themselves and provide opportunities for their children to do so without coercing children’s participation. There is some evidence that parents’ autonomy support contributes to children’s moral development. Eisenberg and Valiente (2002) report that the few studies on parents and children’s moral reasoning that have been done (all in Western contexts) indicate that children who have higher levels of moral reasoning tend to have parents who support and encourage autonomous thinking (who elicit the child’s opinion, ask clarifying questions, and check the child’s understanding as opposed to directly challenging and criticizing the child and lecturing) and who exhibit other patterns already noted above as supporting children’s moral development.

Although some conceptions of children’s conscience development have emphasized parent-child interactions having to do with control and discipline as particularly relevant (Hoffman, 2000), Kochanska (1997) suggests that mutually responsive orientation between parent and child is more likely to lead to development of a strong conscience in the child. Kochanska (2002) defines mutually responsive orientation as a positive, close, mutually binding, and cooperative relationship, encompassing responsiveness and shared positive affect. Responsiveness reflects the parent’s and the child’s “willing, sensitive, supportive, and developmentally appropriate response to one another’s signals of distress, unhappiness, needs, bids for attention, or attempts to exert influence.

Shared positive affect refers to the ‘good times’ shared by the parent and the child, the “pleasurable, harmonious, smoothly flowing interactions infused with positive emotions experienced by both” (Kochanska, 2002, p. 192). These experiences are believed to enable the parent and child to gradually develop a shared working model of their relationship as mutually cooperative. This model induces a sense of obligation in the child to respond positively to parental influences and to trust that the parent will be responsive and supportive. Longitudinal empirical work with mothers and young children has supported these premises (Kochanska, 1997). Mechanisms through which the mutually responsive parent-child relationship operates to influence children’s internalization are thought to include promotion of positive mood in the child (which in turn influences positive prosocial behavior toward the parent on the part of the child) and promoting in the child a responsive stance toward parental influence (Kochanska, 2002). Mothers higher in empathy have been found to be more able to facilitate development of this kind of relationship with their child (Kochanska, 2002).

Summary and Discussion. Self-regulation is a complex, multifaceted capacity that children develop over time. Families support its development by aiding their children’s awareness of their own and others’ emotions and intentions and by fostering children’s understanding of potential consequences of their behavior for others and for themselves. Families in which emotions and their expression are accepted and in which children are taught avenues for appropriate expression of emotion support children in their efforts to regulate their emotions. Parental practices that support self-regulation, including emotion regulation, also support children’s moral development. Autonomy support by parents may be an especially important factor in children’s moral development. Families in which positive affect surrounds interactions and whose engagement together is genuinely enjoyable create not only a climate, but a deeply held stance toward each other that facilitates internalization processes relevant to self-regulation.

Prosocial Development—Responsibility To and For Others

Prosocial behavior has been defined as voluntary behavior intended to benefit another (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998) and as “proactive and reactive responses to the needs of others that serve to promote the well-being of others” (Hastings et al., 2007, p. 639). Hastings et al. (2007) describe prosocial development as including a range of affective and behavioral elements, “including empathy, sympathy, compassion, concern, comforting, helping, sharing, cooperating, volunteering, and donating” (p. 639). Prosocial development is especially relevant to the responsibility dimension.
of this paper because prosocial development is oriented to considering others, assisting them in meeting their needs, and facilitating their well-being. Prosocial behavior reflects responsibility to and for others. Because prosocial behavior promotes emotional and social bonds with family and social group members (Hastings et al., 2007), it is also important to relatedness, one of the three interrelated human needs posited by SDT.

Research on prosocial characteristics of children indicates that they tend to increase with age of the child (Hastings et al., 2007) and that a combination of parental behaviors rather than any single behavior seems to have the greatest association with children’s prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002). Hastings et al. (2007) note that children of parents who effectively support competent emotional functioning are more empathic, sympathetic, helpful, and kind. In their review of emotion regulation research and children’s prosocial development, Hastings et al. (2007) conclude that children’s prosocial development is enhanced when their relationship with their parents is more secure, when they have parents who have a more authoritative than authoritarian parenting style (use reasoning and explanations and avoid power assertive discipline), and when parents support their children’s emotional experience and regulation. In addition, when children’s homes are more stable and economically secure, when their sibling relationships are close and friendly, and when they have opportunities to obtain experience taking care of the needs of others through volunteer and community activities, children are more prosocial. Hastings et al. note that these conclusions are based on longitudinal, replicated studies in which the socializing practices and events preceded the observation of prosocial behavior. In their review of research on children’s prosocial and moral development Eisenberg and Valiente (2002) report similar findings to those of Hastings et al. (2007) regarding prosocial development.

More is known about mother’s roles in processes associated with children’s prosocial and moral development than other family members’ roles and about middle class Euro-American children than other children (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002). Despite this latter pattern, Eisenberg and Valiente do note that cross-cultural work that has been done has indicated that children from non-Western cultures in which children are regularly assigned responsibilities for assisting others are more prosocial than children from other cultures. The findings reported earlier regarding the low levels of parental expectations regarding children’s participation in household work in Western settings (Grusec, Goodnow, & Cohen, 1996; Mosier & Rogoff, 1993; Ochs & Izquierdo, 2009) may indicate that parents in at least some Western societies are missing opportunities to support their

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children’s prosocial development. As the Grusec, Goodnow, & Cohen (1996) study indicated, however, only household work that contributes to others and is expected to be routinely initiated by the child was associated with children’s transfer of prosocial behavior to other situations and even then the finding held only for older children and for transfer situations within the child’s family.

Provision of rewards, both material and social, for children’s prosocial behavior has not been associated with children’s enduring, transferable prosocial behavior unless combined with other parental approaches already noted (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002). An SDT interpretation of this finding is that externally provided rewards leads to children’s sense of their prosocial behavior as externally motivated rather than internally motivated and hence, is unlikely to be sustained when no reward is provided.

Research over many years on children’s prosocial development has led scholars (e.g., Hoffman, 2000) to believe that children’s empathy development may be critical to prosocial behavior. Empathy has been defined as the “emotional capacity to apprehend the affective states of others, and to some extent, share in their affective experiences” (Hastings et al., 2007, p. 640). Other definitions noted by Hoffman (2000) include “cognitive awareness of another person’s internal states” and “vicarious affective response to another person” (p. 29). Evidence suggests that when parents support children’s empathy development, the stage is set for children’s prosocial behavior and development (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002). Parents’ who exert greater maturity demands (more structure in SDT terms), whose interactions with their children are characterized by warmth, who encourage their children’s emotional expressiveness, who are not rejecting of their children, and who do not emphasize physical discipline have school age children with greater insight into their own emotions, greater emotional expressiveness and who also express less anger (Hastings et al., 2007). Less angry and more expressive and insightful children have been shown to be more empathic (Strayer & Roberts, 2004).

Summary and Discussion. Prosocial behavior reflects responsibility to and for others. Children’s prosocial behavior increases with age and is stronger when the child has a history of a secure attachment relationship. Parental practices described in the previous subsection as supporting children’s self-regulation and its emotional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects also support children’s prosocial behavior. In addition, when children are involved on a routine basis in responsibilities that provide care for others, their prosocial development is stronger. Children’s empathy development, in particular, is believed to enhance their prosocial development.

Connections, Complexities, and Questions

Connections

Connections between autonomy and responsibility are widely apparent in this discussion of theory and research relevant to families and children. Systems of thought have been presented that encompass both autonomy and responsibility as compatible and complementary, as dialectic aspects of human life, as providing lenses through which to view culture, and as integral aspects of children’s development. These systems of thought have included the thinking underlying children’s roles in various cultures, and theoretical systems of thought generated by scholars. Specific examples of these systems include the concepts of voluntary responsibility and responsible autonomy; belief systems regarding children’s development, roles, and family relationships; and self-determination theorists’ explication of the process through which personal autonomy and social group mores and values become integrated.

Connections between children’s expression and development of autonomy and responsibility and patterns of familial assumptions, practices, affect, interaction, and relationships have also been made. These patterns are connected to parents’ socialization practices, which reflect parents’ priorities regarding their children and parents’ assumptions about their children and themselves. Parent’s priorities and assumptions, in turn, are connected to their cultural and social setting. These connections form a system of conditions that contribute at various levels to children’s development of autonomy and responsibility. The parent-child attachment relationship, parental provision of autonomy support, involvement, and structure, and the degree to which children are given opportunities to experience responsibility (including responsibility to and for others) represent influential aspects of children’s socialization and relationships systems. These conditions are connected to developments that are critical to children’s autonomy and responsibility development, including the security of children’s attachment, children’s self-regulation capacities, and children’s prosocial development. Complexities

The systems of thought, conditions, and practices summarized above makes it evident that there is no single, simple answer to the question of what families’ roles are in helping children develop autonomy and responsibility values. Families’ roles in this process are obviously multifaceted. The child’s own nature and agency and how these interact with the systems noted above is a significant complexity that must be considered, understood, and incorporated in research.
intended to shed light on the question of family roles. In addition, there is also great complexity in the wide-ranging variability of families and their settings, which should caution us about grouping families and labeling them based on broad, easily observed features. Questions such as “What is the case for families whose processes and relationships have these characteristics or those characteristics?” is likely to be a more powerful research question than are questions focused primarily on surface features such as structure (e.g., single parent families, intact families) and socioeconomic status (e.g., low, middle, and high income families).

Similarly, research that focuses only on parental techniques, actions, or general styles and child outcomes, cannot account for relationship factors and characteristics of the child, the parent, and the situation that are critical in the dance between parents and their children that begins at birth and continues throughout children’s developmental years and beyond. Finer grained studies that look more deeply into relationship and interaction processes and the characteristics of those involved and the setting, and that do so over time are needed in order to encompass critical phenomena. As research methods, data analysis approaches, and theories (such as SDT) that accommodate more complexity continue to develop, scholars will be more able to conduct and interpret research that tells us more.

A third complexity is the constraints on using what we know. For example, knowing what we do about the value to children’s prosocial development of their involvement in caring for others, and knowing that in some societies families place little emphasis on involving children in such responsibilities, one might propose that families in these societies change their ways toward expecting more involvement of their children in the work of the family. As cross-cultural scholars have pointed out, however, some cultural contexts are organized in ways that support and depend on this practice, but in others, the conditions that make this feasible, valued, and supportive of children’s development are not in place. Thus, we must be cautious about simply transporting practices from one culturally embedded situation to another and expect that they will function similarly. One of the values of cross-cultural research is that it can help us see ourselves in deeper and more accurate ways, which then gives us the opportunity to change cultural patterns that we find disturbing.

Questions

Are autonomy and responsibility personal characteristics, behavioral descriptors, or values?

The theory and research discussed in this paper suggests they are all three. Evidence was presented

that suggests that autonomy and responsibility are an orientation that children display in various degrees, which are to some extent at least, a reflection of their developmentally significant experiences. The theory and research discussed has described children’s behavior as autonomous and responsible and as dependent and irresponsible. Reflection of autonomy and responsibility as values has been evident in the discussions of autonomy support (implying that autonomy is something important) and in the cross-cultural work that pointed to the importance of children’s valuing of responsibility.

*Are values transmitted or are they constructed by children for themselves?* The socialization literature reflects a heavy emphasis on parents’ role in inculcating appropriate mores and values in their children, often implying that parents somehow “put” values into their children and that whatever values a society reflects are desirable ones that should be “passed on”. Such a view is not reflective of the role of the child as an agent, nor reflective of a critically thinking parent or child. Constructivist theories of learning suggest that children must construct values for themselves in order to make them their own. The internalization process outlined in SDT suggests that children develop values over time and that, while the process regarding parentally endorsed values may begin with transmission, it cannot stop there if the child is to truly accept and own these values. The child must construct them for herself and, in the process, may modify what is finally accepted as the child’s own.

*Given the organization and way of life in societies where children have few opportunities to learn to value responsibility (including and especially responsibility to and for others) through roles in everyday routines, can these opportunities be increased?* This question is relevant to societies that include and are like those reflected in the cross-cultural studies (the US, Canada, and Australia) in which children were reported to be minimally involved in contributing to the work of their families on a regular basis. Ochs’ and Izquierdo’s (2009) suggestion that children’s contributions to their families’ household may not be valued by parents and that parents may view children as not competent to make contributions to the household is thought provoking. One might ask whether household work by family members (including that done by parents) is valued by either the parents or these cultures at the present time. Not valuing it may have become functional as the number of dual earner families has increased and necessitated changed standards and the use of more resources external to the family for meeting family needs (e.g., eating out, using a laundry service, hiring cleaning help or ignoring the need for it, purchasing wrinkle-free clothing and being thankful that a

trend-conscious fashion industry has defined the wrinkled look and “distressed” clothing as stylish). Not involving children in household tasks may be more a reflection of limitations on the time parents have available to be concerned about household tasks and the devaluing of them that has been psychologically functional, as well as of the difficulty of finding time to help their children learn to do them. To paraphrase Grusec, Goodnow, and Cohen (1996), it is quicker and more efficient as a parent to simply do oneself the few tasks that can’t be avoided.

Schools have increasingly involved children in community service through service learning and other projects with some evidence that these experiences do contribute to children’s prosocial development (Hastings et al., 2007). This trend seems to be an important one, given families’ current patterns. It is also clear that some families do involve their children in community service with similar benefits for children’s prosocial development. Raising parents’ and schools’ awareness of the developmental significance of sustained, expected, self-initiated responsibilities for benefitting others is one step that can be taken toward enhancing children’s valuing of responsibility to and for others. Another is helping parents structure such activities in ways that work with the intense schedules of many families today. A third is to help schools and parents structure joint opportunities in which consistent oversight is shared by both.

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